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Refunding Overcharges Under the Emergency Petroleum Allo-
cation Act: The Evolution of a Compensatory Obligation 
For ten years, various federal agencies enforced petroleum price 
control regulations.' These controls are now gone,2 but they will not 
easily be forgotten. Many violations remain unresolved,3 and the 
Department of Energy (DOE) is committed to remedying 
overcharges that occurred during the decade of regulation.4 Resolu-
tion of these violations could result in "a potential recovery of sev-
eral billions of dollars on behalf of large and small customers and 
I. Price control regulations were administered by the Cost of Living Council from 1971 to 
1973, by the Federal Energy Office from 1973 to 1974, by the Federal Energy Administration 
from 1974 to 1977, and by the Department of Energy from 1977 to 1981. 
2. President Reagan lifted oil price controls by executive order on January 28, 1981. See 
Exec. Order No. 12,287, 46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1981). Presidential authority to reestablish ape-
troleum price control program will expire on September 30, 198 l. See note 22 i'!fra. However, 
Congress is now considering legislation to continue controls on a standby basis. See EN. 
MNGMT. (CCH), Sept. 2, 1981, at 2. 
3. As of January 1981, the DOE had resolved only 32% of the alleged violations of over 
$13 billion. U.S. GAO, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NEEDS TO RESOLVE BILLIONS IN ALLEGED OIL PRICING VIOLA· 
TIONS i (1981) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. Former DOE special counsel Paul Bloom 
estimated that 200 unresolved enforcement actions were pending as of January 20, 1981. EN. 
MNGMT. (CCH), Mar. 3, 1981, at l. This estimate was confirmed in recent House hearings. 
See Impact ef Proposed FY 1982 Budget on Department ef Energy Eeforcement Program: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm on Oversight and Investigations efthe House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 91th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (unpublished transcript, 
on file with the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings]. As of August 11, 
1981, only sixteen of the thirty-five "major refiners" have resolved their price disputes with the 
DOE. See EN MNGMT. (CCH), Aug. 11, 1981, at 3. It could take years to resolve the inevita-
ble administrative proceedings and litigation arising from DOE/oil company disagreements. 
GAO REPORT, supra, at iii. Bloom predicts that resolution of the outstanding controversies 
would "require at least two to three years of heavy and serious legal effort." EN. MNGMT. 
(CCH), Mar. 3, 1981, at I. 
4. See [Current Report] EN. USERS REP. (BNA) No. 394, at 354 (Feb. 26, 1981). In fact, 
the DOE may be legally obligated "to vigorously pursue all known civil and criminal viola-
tions, to complete audits, to open new ones as necessary to assure conformity and obedience to 
law, and to prosecute violations newly discovered by such audits." 1981 Hearings, supra note 
3, at 2 (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
The Department has prepared a five-year plan for phasing out its compliance programs. 
GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at iii. Under that plan, the Department would complete all audits 
in 1983 and all litigation and special investigations in 1987. EN. MNGMT. (CCH), Apr. 14, 
1981, at 4. The Administration's proposed budget called for sharply reduced expenditures for 
enforcement. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 34. The GAO asserted that these budget cuts 
"might seriously impair DO E's ability to enforce the compliance program." Id at 35. Admin-
istration officials claimed, however, that the DOE would continue vigorously to pursue en-
forcement actions. See Wall St. J., March 12, 1981, at 10, col. 2. But the House Government 
Operations Committee has concluded that the Reagan Administration is showing a lack of 
interest in recovering overcharges, and suggested that the proposed cutbacks in enforcement 
are " 'suggestive of a grant of amnesty' for pricing violations by the nation's largest oil compa-
nies." Detroit Free Press, June 12, 1981, at lB, col. 2. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 
(statement of Rep. Dingell). The GAO recommended that Congress provide adequate funding 
for the enforcement effort, GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 35, and proposed revisions in the 
DOE's transition plan. Id at 38. Congress responded by authonzing $48 million for the 
DO E's 1982 fiscal year enforcement activities, four times the amount proposed in the Adminis-
tration's original budget. See EN. MNGMT. (CCH), Aug. 11, 1981, at 2. 
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consumers of U.S. refiner companies."5 
The DOE's current enforcement policy, however, benefits these 
customers and consumers minimally. The Department generally has 
been unable to obtain compensation for parties that were injured by 
overcharges. 6 In fact, only about ten percent of the claimed value of 
the settlements to date represents consumer remedies.7 Maintaining 
that it is not obligated to return overcharges to actual victims, 8 the 
DOE has distributed proceeds from administrative enforcement ac-
tions to military personnel,9 charities, 10 and the poor11 without re-
gard to whether the overcharges victimized these recipients. The 
Department also has "remedied" pricing violations by requiring vio-
lators to reduce "banked costs" or invest in refinery capacity. 12 
5. EN. MNGMT. (CCH), Mar. 3, 1981, at 1-2 (quoting Paul Bloom, former DOE special 
counsel). 
6. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at iv. A major obstable to compensation is the "DO E's 
inability to identify precisely who has been injured by overcharges, because in many instances 
the overcharges were passed through the marketing chain in subsequent sales." Id See text at 
note llO i'!fra. 
1. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-44. 
8. See Proposed Consent Order with Phillips Petroleum Co., 44 Fed. Reg. 66,984, 66,984 
(1979); Phillips Petroleum Co. Consent Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 1934, 1935 (1980) (final order). 
9. See Proposed Consent Order with Getty Oil Co., 44 Fed. Reg. 71,453 (1979); Getty Oil 
Co. Consent Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 9992 (1980) (final order). 
IO. The General Counsel of DOE's Office of Special Counsel for Compliance personally 
disbursed four million dollars to four church-affiliated charities from a consent order with 
Standard Oil Company. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Despite charges that this 
disbursement was beyond DOE's authority, the agency let the charities keep 75% of the funds. 
Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1981, at l, col. 3. 
11. See Proposed Consent Order with Getty Oil Co., 45 Fed. Reg. 71,453, 71,454 (1979); 
Getty Oil Co. Consent Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 9992, 9993 (1980) (final order). 
12. Refinery expansion has recently accounted for considerable proportions of some con-
sent order "remedies" for price overcharges. See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) Consent Order, 
45 Fed. Reg. 26,747 (1980); Phillips Petroleum Co. Consent Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 1934 (1980); 
GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-44. The DOE does not intend such settlements to have any 
compensatory value. Rather, they seek to "accelerate the companies' development plans in 
accordance with overall United States energy policies." Id at 48. 
The DOE has also directed reduction of violator's "banked costs." See Phillips Petroleum 
Co. Consent Order, 45 Fed. Reg. at 1935. Banked costs arose when refiners charged prices 
lower than the allowable ceiling price. Refiners were permitted to "bank" the difference be-
tween the ceiling price and the actual price on products sold. The refiner could later draw on 
these banks to increase product prices above the ceiling price if market conditions permitted. 
Computation and application of banked costs was an extremely complex accounting proce-
dure. See IO C.F.R. § 212.83(e) (1980). Banked costs ceased to exist upon the lifting of price 
controls; at that time refiners had accrued banked costs of $30 billion. ENERGY MNGMT. 
(CCH) Jan. 27, 1981, at 1. To the extent high banks were a result of market forces, reduction 
of banked costs may have been an illusory remedy. See Deacon, An Economic Analysis ef 
Gasoline Price Controls, 18 NAT. REsouRCES J. 801, 804-05 (1978). 
Bank reductions represented about 42% of the amounts obtained in the first five global 
consent orders. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 49. As the GAO pointed out, "downward bank 
adjustments ... did not necessarily represent restitution to injured parties," because "plentiful 
gasoline market[s] never allowed [some of the companies] to pass banked costs through any-
way." Id Of course, with the advent of deregulation, all future bank adjustments would be 
meaningless. Id See 1981 Hearings, supra note 3, at 109-10. 
For a description of some recent consent orders that include these remedies, see Ten Oil 
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These noncompensatory remedies putatively represent a disgorge-
ment of billions of dollars of petroleum price overcharges.13 
The DOE's authority to order noncompensatory remedies has 
been seriously questioned.14 This Note will evaluate the propriety of 
such remedies in light of the history of petroleum price control en-
forcement. Although the DO E's enabling legislation 15 does not ex-
plicitly impose a compensatory obligation, the Note finds that 
Congress anticipated that remedies would compensate, to the extent 
feasible, those persons actually overcharged. Part I traces the devel-
opment of a compensatory obligation through the various stages of 
price regulation. Part II criticizes the DOE for abnegating that obli-
gation. The Note concludes that the Department's recent consent 
orders violate both its own rules and Congress's intent, and suggests 
a course of action that better achieves the compensatory objective 
that is the legacy of petroleum price controls. 
l. THE EVOLUTION OF A COMPENSATORY OBLIGATION 
When DOE audits reveal potential civil violations of the pricing 
regulations, the Department may institute legal actions in court, 16 
Concerns Settle Charges of Overpricing, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1981, at 8, col. 2. On the subject of 
banked costs in general, see Federal Energy Eeforcement Activities, Hearing Before the Perma-
nent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 19-20 (1975) (statement of Robert E. Montgomery, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as 1975 In-
vestigations Hearing]. 
13. An exact calculation is impossible, since the DOE has not disclosed its est.imate of 
overcharges in the above enforcement actions. However, the DOE claimed 690 million dollars 
in remedies in the Standard Oil (Indiana) Consent Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,747 (1980), 200 
million dollars in remedies in the Phillips Petroleum Co. Consent Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 1934 
(1980), and 25 million dollars in remedies in the Getty Oil Co. Consent Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 
9992 (1980). The total value of settlements as of January 1981 was approximately $4.2 billion. 
GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 40. 
14. The Comptroller General's Office has asserted that such remedies are not authorized 
by law in a report to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the 
Interstate and Foreign Comme~ce Committee. See Letter from Milton J. Socolar to Honora-
ble John D. Dingell (Oct. 10, 1980) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). A recent 
GAO report has also criticized the DOE for failure to compensate the victims of overcharges. 
See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 40-52. 
Thus far, court challenges to the remedies used by the DOE in consent orders have been 
uniformly unsuccessful. For example, a coalition of public interest groups attacked a number 
of DOE consent orders, charging that the DOE's noncompensatory remedies were illegal. 
Consumer Energy Council v. Duncan, 4 EN. MNGMT. (CCH) ~ 26,314 (D.D.C. April 1, 1981). 
The plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed for lack of standing and failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies. 4 EN. MNGMT. ~ 26,314, at 28,417. The states of Minnesota and New York 
challenged a DOE consent order issued to Standard Oil Company (Indiana) on similar 
grounds. Minnesota v. Standard Oil, 4 EN. MNGMT. (CCH) ~ 26,316 (D. Minn. June 18, 
1981). The court simply deferred to the broad powers of the DOE, without any analysis of the 
limits of those powers. See 4 EN. MNGMT. (CCH) ~ 26,316, at 28,429. 
15. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. III 1979)). 
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 754 (1976). 
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issue "remedial orders,"17 or negotiate settlements.18 This Note 
seeks to define the scope of the remedies that the DOE may impose 
through "remedial orders."19 Congress first used the phrase "reme-
dial orders" in 1977, and did not define it. But an examination of 
prior agency practice and Congress's role in establishing that prac-
tice strongly evinces that Congress intended such orders to compen-
sate the victims of overcharges. 
This examination must proceed initially from the Emergency Pe-
troleum Allocation Act of 197320 (EPAA). Passed in response to na-
tionwide shortages of petroleum products, 21 the EP AA gave the 
President temporary allocation and pricing authority.22 However, 
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 7193 (Supp. III 1979). 
18. See 10 C.F.R. § 205.1991 (1980). 
DOE enforcement actions are initiated by a Notice of Probable Violation (NOPV) to the 
suspected price violator. 10 C.F.R. § 205.191 (1980). The suspected price violator is provided 
an opportunity to reply to the NOPV. If the DOE remains convinced that a violation exists, it 
may issue a proposed remedial order (PRO). 10 C.F.R. § 205.192 (1980). The defendant may 
contest the PRO in a hearing before the DOE's Office of Hearings and Appeals. 10 C.F.R. 
§ 205.193 (1980). The Office of Hearings and Appeals may then enter a final remedial order, 
10 C.F.R. § 205.199B (1980), subject to a further administrative appeal, 10 C.F.R. § 205.199C 
(1980). At any time, the suspected price violator may enter into a consent order with the DOE 
to "resolve an outstanding compliance investigation or proceeding." 10 C.F.R. § 205.199J(a) 
(1980). The consent order does not imply an admission of guilt. 10 C.F.R. § 205.199J(a) 
(1980). However, it does have "the same force and effect as a remedial order," 10 C.F.R. 
§ 205.199J(b) (1980), and utilizes the same remedies as a remedial order, 10 C.F.R. § 205.1991 
(1980). 
19. At the same time, the Note establishes limits on the remedies that the DOE can agree 
to in consent orders. Only remedies that are authorized for remedial orders may be employed 
in consent orders. 10 C.F.R. § 205.1991 (1980). See text at note 95 i'!fra. 
20. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-56 (1976)). 
21. The shortages are generally perceived as resulting from the Arab oil embargo following 
the 1973 Yorn Kippur war. In fact, the legislation was pending prior to the embargo, and was 
originally introduced to counter domestic heating oil shortages. See I EN. MNGMT. (CCH) ~ 
3301, at 3303 (1980). 
22. Congress originally specified that this temporary authority would expire on February 
28, 1975. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627, 632 
(1973) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-56 (1976)). However, it was later extended through Sep-
tember 30, 1981. 15 U.S.C. § 760(g) (1976). This power was discretionary in the President, 
and he could terminate price controls at any time. See note 2 supra. 
In a sense, this authority was redundant because the President already exercised control 
over petroleum prices under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA). See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1904 note (1976). This authority was exercised through regulations administered by the Cost 
of Living Council. The EPAA's pricing authority served merely as a necessary adjunct to the 
allocation of limited supplies of petroleum. The Act sought equitable distribution of petro-
leum products, 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(l)(F) (1976), and was not mtended primarily to protect 
consumers from high prices. See Templeton's Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 402 F. Supp. 368 
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (Congress's foremost concern was to develop a fair rule-making process 
rather than to develop adjudicatory mechanisms to resolve disputes between private parties); 
119 CONG. REC. 34,473 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Steiger) (arguing that the Federal Trade Com-
mission should not be given oversight powers regarding the EPAA, because the Act was not 
consumer legislation). 
For a general description of CLC enforcement of price controls under the ESA, see R. 
KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE (1978); A. WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABILITY: THE 
WAGE-PRICE FREEZE OF 1971, at 84-98 (1973). The CLC was created by executive order on 
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the Act did not empower the President to seek consumer remedies 
for overcharges. Instead, section 754 incorporated by reference the 
enforcement provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 
(ESA).23 This section thereby permitted the President to remedy vi-
olations of the EP AA by petitioning the court for injunctive and 
restitutionary relief,24 as well as by seeking civil or criminal penal-
ties.25 
Although Congress initially did not view the EP AA as consumer 
protection legislation, 26 subsequent actions by both Congress and the 
August 15, 1971 to regulate and enforce the provisions of the ESA. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 
C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975 Compilation) {imposing an immediate 90-day wage and price freeze, 
known as Phase I, which included petroleum products). Following the 90-day freeze, the Pres-
ident instituted a program of flexible price controls to stabilize the economy. Exec. Order No. 
11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971-1975 Compilation) (Phase II); Exec. Order No. I 1,695, 3 C.F.R. 741 
(1971-1975 Compilation) (Phase III); Exec. Order No. 11,723, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1971-1975 Compi-
lation) (Phase IV). The economic stabilization program was terminated by Exec. Order No. 
11,788, 3 C.F.R. 877 (1971-1975 Compilation), on June 18, 1974. 
23. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976)). 
Congress intended that regulations under the EP AA be enforced "as if such regulation had 
been promulgated, such order had been issued, or such action had been taken under the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 1970." H.R. REP. No. 531, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in 
(1973] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2532; 2599. Congress apparently believed that the 
EP AA's allocation and pricing regulations could be policed in the same manner as price con• 
trols under the ESA. The Cost of Living Council (CLC) has been remarkably successful in 
achieving compliance without resort to its statutory enforcement tools during the Phase I price 
freeze; the Council instituted only eight suits to enjoin price violations during this period. See 
A. WEBER, supra note 22, at 95. Although the CLC was less successful in achieving voluntary 
compliance during later phases of the program, its remedial provisions were used sparingly. 
See M. KOSTERS & J. AHALT. CONTROL OF INFLATION 26 (Domestic Affairs Studies, AEI No. 
37, 1975). Congress, perhaps naively, expected the EPAA price controls would receive the 
same degree of voluntary compliance. In fact, one Senator stated that he "could not imagine a 
responsible wholesaler or retailer [pirating] under the [price] constraints." 119 CONG. REC. 
17,959 (1973) (remarks of Sen. McIntyre). 
24. 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(l) (1976) (incorporating ESA § 209). 
Section 209 states "[a]ny such court may also issue mandatory injunctions commanding 
any person to comply with any such order or regulation. In addition to such injunctive relief, 
the court may also order restitution of moneys received in violation of any such order or 
regulation." 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976). 
The EPAA also incorporated section 210 of the ESA, which permits citizens to bring ac-
tions in federal district court for aeclaratory judgments, injunctions and damages arising from 
price overcharges. See 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(l) (1976), For a discussion of the use of these suits, 
see Comment, The Private Cause of Action in the E'!forcement of Oil and Petroleum Price Regu-
lations, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 901 (1978). 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 754 {a) (1976). 
Congress originally adopted the civil and criminal penalties of§ 208 of the ESA. 87 Stat. 
at 633. However, Congress eventually increased the penalty amounts above those originally 
specified in the Economic Stabilization Act. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, J?ub. L. No. 
94-163, Title IV, Part B, § 452, 89 Stat. 948-49 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 754 (1976)). 
26. See 119 CONG. REc. 34,473 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Steiger) (arguing that the Federal 
Trade Commission should not be given oversight powers regarding the EP AA, because the Act 
was not consumer legislation). 
Congress intended the EPAA to alleviate the impact of petroleum shortages across the 
country by providing "equitable distribution of ... petroleum products at equitable prices." 
15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(J)(F) (1976). Congress sought to protect independent refiners from supply 
curtailments, 15 U.S.C. § 753(b){l)(F) (1976), and to ensure adequate heating oil supplies in 
geographic regions. 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(J)(F) (1976). But Congress did not intend to create a 
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agencies charged with enforcing the Act reveal a burgeoning desire 
to compensate the victims of overcharges. Uncertainty and confu-
sion characterized the EPAA's initial implementation.27 But Con-
gressional hearings, promulgated regulations, and early 
administrative remedies provided a firm basis for the compensatory 
obligation that ripened in the Department of Energy Organization 
Act (DOEA).28 
The Federal Energy Office29(FEO) initiated the movement to-
ward consumer remedies. The FEO's revised regulations30 author-
ized "remedial orders,"31 which permitted the Office to resolve 
consumer protection agency to remedy the effects of price violations on individual consumers. 
See Templeton's Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 402 F. Supp. 368, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1975) 
(Congress's foremost concern was to develop a fair rule-making process rather than to develop 
adjudicatory mechanisms to resolve disputes between private parties). 
27. See SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94T,H CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE FEDERAL ENERGY AD-
MINISTRATION: ENFORCEMENT OF PETROLEUM PRICE REGULATIONS, (Co=. Print 1975) 
[hereinafter cited as 1975 Committee Print). 
In fact, the entire history of energy law and regulation in the United States is tangled. 
Prior to 1973, no single federal agency was charged with energy-related responsibilities. Con-
gress enacted the EPAA on November 27, 1973. On December 4, President Nixon created the 
Federal Energy Office (FEO) and delegated his authority under the Act to it. Exec. Order No. 
11,748, 3 C.F.R. 822 (1971-1975 Compilation). On January 2, 1974, the FEO implemented the 
first set of regulations under the EPAA. IO C.F.R. §§ 200.1-.81 (1974). These interim regula-
tions, borrowed largely from the CLC regulations, were superseded on January 15 by regula-
tions constituting "a total revision of the Mandatory Petroleum Products Allocation Program." 
39 Fed. Reg. 1924, 1925 (1974). 
In April of 1974, the Senate held hearings that included a thorough investigation into the 
FEO's remedial authority under the EPAA. In May, Congress enacted the Federal Energy 
Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-787 (1976); on June 27, an executive order cre-
ated the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) and transferred all FEO functions to it. Exec. 
Order No. 11,790, 3 C.F.R. 882 (1971-1975 Compilation). On October l, 1974, the FEA 
promulgated new regulations more carefully defining its remedial authority. In April and May 
of 1975, the Senate held hearings to investigate the FEA's implementation of the EPAA. On 
September 2, 1975, the FEA promulgated regulations strongly reasserting its remedial author-
ity. 
The EPAA was reenacted or modified three times during this period. The first reenactment 
was by the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-99, 89 Stat. 481 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 753 (1976)); the second was by the Act of November 14, 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 94-133, 89 Stat. 694 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 753 (1976)); the third was by the omnibus 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 874 (1975) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15, 42, 50 App. U.S.C.). The last act, which extended the EPAA through 
September 30, 1981, was one of the most significant pieces of legislation enacted by the 94th 
Congress. None of these laws in any way altered the provisions concerning EPAA remedial 
authority. 
On August 4, 1977, Congress enacted the Department of Energy Organization Act 
(DOEA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. III 1979). The DOE thereupon assumed all of the 
FEA's duties. 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. III 1979); Exec. Order No. 12,038, 3 C.F.R. 136 (1978-
1979 Compilation). See generally Oversight-Federal Energy Administration Programs: Hear-
ings on S. Res. 45 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
479-91 (1975) (statement of Frank G. Zarb) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Interior Hearings). 
28. See note 15 supra. 
29. See note 27 supra. 
30. See note 27 supra. 
31. IO C.F.R. § 205.81-.87 (1974). The regulations defined remedial orders as orders "re-
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violations and take remedial action without filing an action in fed-
eral court.32 Neither the EPAA nor the FEO's regulations defined 
the nature of the available relief, but Congress began in 1974 to de-
mand consumer remedies. Recognizing a widespread public percep-
tion that oil companies were violating the price controls at the 
expense of consumers,33 Congress sought assurances that the FEO's 
remedial orders were compensating the victims of overcharges.34 In 
response, the FEO's General Counsel testified that the Office "in-
tends to take strong enforcement action to compel refunds to the 
marketplace" whenever it uncovered pricing violations.35 The FEO 
was sufficiently certain of its statutory authority to require compen-
sation that it felt no need to ask Congress for additional remedial 
power.36 
The FEO had no opportunity to fulfill this commitment; it was 
quiring a person to cease a violation or to take action to eliminate or compensate for the effects 
of a violation, ... or which impose other sanctions." 10 C.F.R. § 205.2 (1974). 
32. 10 C.F.R. § 205.86 (1974). Although this type of administrative resolution was new to 
the FEO, there was ample precedent for the approach. The CLC, which had delegated pricing 
authority over petroleum products to the FEO, see CLC Order No. 47, 6 C.F.R. 455 (1974), 
used the same apparatus for resolving pricing violations. 6 C.F.R. § 140.50-.60 (1974). More-
over, the Price Commission, a component of the CLC, had begun the practice of using reme-
dial orders on June 24, 1972. 6 C.F.R. § 305.80-.90 (1972). The FEO adopted the CLC's 
administrative remedies procedures, including the remedial order provisions, virtually verba-
tim. Compare 6 C.F.R. §§ 140.50-.56 (1974) with 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.81-.87 (1974). 
There is little question that the energy agencies may issue remedial orders, despite the lack 
of express authorization in the EPAA. In Bonray Oil Co. v. DOE, 472 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. 
Okla. 1978), qffd per curiam, 601 F.2d 1191 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1979), the court held that 
the FEA had an implied power to order refunds under the Act. 472 F. Supp. at 904. The court 
found that refunding overcharges was a "rational method" of achieving the statutory goal of 
"equitable distribution of ... petroleum products at equitable prices." 472 F. Supp. at 904. 
Accord, Wentz Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. FEA, 410 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Neb. 1976). It 
is worthwhile to note that the victims in Bonray were readily identifiable. See 472 F. Supp. at 
900. Cf. United States v. Ringer & Ringer Enterprises, 492 F. Supp. 350 (D. Colo. 1980) (FEA 
remedial order directing price rollback overturned on ground that rollback did not adequately 
return overcharge to victims). 
33. See, e.g., 1975 Investigations Hearing, supra note 12, at 2; Standby Energy Emergency 
Authorities Act: Joint Hearing on S. 32567 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular 
Affairs and the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government 
Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Standby Authority Hear-
ing). 
34. See 1974 Standby Authority Hearing, supra note 33. 
35. 1974 Standby Authority Hearings, supra note 33, at 118, 139 (statement of William N. 
Walker) (emphasis added). In fact, Walker stated that remedial orders challenging $40 million 
in cost passthroughs had already been issued against Continental Oil Co. (Conoco), Ashland 
Oil, Inc., and Koch Oil. He implied that the remedy used would be price adjustment. Id at 
138, 332-33. Walker clearly indicated that the FEO was committed to insuring that violators 
"disgorg[e) to the public their ill-gotten gain,'' and he promised the Committee that consumer 
refunds would follow within ''weeks, or perhaps months, at the most" of discovery of pricing 
violations. Id at 332. 
36. Id at 139. 
Mr. Walker's statement so impressed the Senators that his remarks were used to challenge 
FEA administrators one year later. See 1975 Interior Hearings, supra note 27, at 572-74, 607-
11. 
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replaced by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) shortly after 
these hearings. 37 Within months, however, the FEA promulgated 
new regulations that would enhance its ability to order consumer 
refunds.38 First, it amended the remedial order provisions to author-
ize such orders for all violations.39 Second, it adopted a provision 
specifically authorizing refunds to injured consumers.40 
Congress nevertheless continued to press the FEA for stronger 
consumer remedies.41 In a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee 
on Investigations, Chairman Jackson described the plight of the 
overcharged consumer as a "national tragedy," and criticized the 
FEA's failure to take "corrective action."42 And a Senate Report 
concluded that the FEA's failure to provide adequate remedies for 
overcharged consumers was one of the major shortcomings of the 
EP AA enforcement effort.43 The Report recommended that the 
FEA take steps to ensure that "the benefit[s] of ... remedial ac-
tion[s] ... [are] passed through to the consumers who ultimately 
paid for the overcharge."44 
The FEA responded by assuring Congress that all overcharges 
would be refunded to the injured consumers. Testifying before a 
Senate subcommittee, the FEA's General Counsel stated that "[t]he 
37. See note 27 supra. 
38. See IO C.F.R. §§ 205.1-.237 (1975). These regulations were promulgated only by au-
thority of the EP AA, since the Federal Energy Administration Act (FEAA) did not vest in the 
FEA any remedial authority whatsoever. The FEAA did state that the FEA's goals included 
the "promot[ion of] stability of energy prices to the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 764(b)(5) (1976). 
However, the legislative history of the FEAA indicates that this admonition did not create an 
enforcement authority in the FEA beyond that delegated under the EPAA. A sponsor of the 
bill indicated that this language "merely indicated the scope in which the agency could act, but 
would not independently give the agency, for instance, authority to set prices and to roll back 
profits." 120 CONG. REc. 5296 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Horton). The sponsor emphatically 
agreed that the bill as a whole was "totally for the purpose of creating a structure to exercise 
authorities which must be derived from other legislation." Id. Rep. Horton's statements were 
affirmed by Rep. Holifield, the chairman of the Committee that reported the bill. Id. at 5297. 
39. IO C.F.R. § 205.190 (1975). 
40. IO C.F.R. § 205.194 (1975). 
This provision allowed the FEA to mandate price rollbacks or refunds of amounts paid in 
excess of regulated prices, or to take "other action . . . necessary to eliminate or to compensate 
for the effects of a violation." IO C.F.R. § 205.194 (1975). However, DOE dropped the impo-
sition of "other sanctions" from its definition of remedial orders, see IO C.F.R. § 205.2 (1975), 
apparently doubting its authority to impose civil penalties. For a discussion of the general 
issue of agency imposition of civil penalties, see Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil 
Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 CouJM. L. REV. 1435 (1979). 
41. See 197.5 Interior Hearings, supra note 27, at 607-17; Congressional Oversight of Admin-
istrative Agencies (Federal Energy Administration): Hearing Before the Suhcomm. on Separation 
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited 
as 197.5 Separation of Powers Hearing]. 
42. 197.5 Investigations Hearing, supra note 12, at 2. Senator Jackson went on to say in his 
closing statement, "I want the benefits that have accrued to [price violators] at the great ex-
pense of our citizens to be stripped away and repaid." Id. at 59. 
43. See 1975 Committee Print, supra note 27, at 35. 
44. Id. at 42. 
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FEA has all the authority it needs to cause any overcharges . . . to 
be refunded . . . to consumers. You may be sure that we are going 
to use that authority to the full extent required."45 Another top FEA 
official testified that the agency sought "price rollbacks or refunds in 
all instances where it can be demonstrated that violations have actu-
ally resulted in higher prices . . . than the regulations allow."46 He, 
too, asserted that the FEA had full authority to order refunds.47 
The FEA, however, did not indicate the source of this authority 
to order consumer remedies. The EP AA did not explicitly provide 
for refunds;48 the Act merely authorized its enforcing agency to seek 
certain remedies in court .49 If the FEA relied on the provisions of 
the EP AA for authority to order refunds, its confidence in its author-
ity was groundless.50 Similarly, the Federal Energy Administration 
45. 1975 Investigations Hearing, supra note 12, at 31 (testimony of Gorman C. Smith). See 
1975 Interior Hearings, supra note 27, at 617 (letter of Robert E. Montgomery, Jr.). The letter 
is dated May 29, 1975. The question answered by Montgomery was prefaced by the portion of 
former FEO General Counsel Walker's statement regarding FEO's commitment to compensa-
tory remedies. Id at 607-11. See note 35 supra. For similar testimony by the General Coun-
sel, see Emergency Petroleum Allocation Extension Act of 1974: Hearings on S. 3717 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1974) (testimony of 
Robert E. Montgomery, Jr.). The hearing took place on July 31, 1974. 
46. 1975 Investigations Hearing, supra note 12, at 13 (statement of Gorman C. Smith) (em-
phasis added). 
Smith also described FEA's treatment of violations not necessarily resulting in actual 
overcharges. In instances where banked costs (allowable costs not yet passed on in the form of 
price increases) were sufficient to cover the violations, FEA merely reduced the banked costs 
by the appropriate amount. See id. at 9, 13, 44-45. For a brief description of the history and 
evolution of banked costs, see id. at 19-20 (statement of Robert E. Montgomery, Jr.). The 
DOE has maintained this practice. See text at note 12 supra. 
47. 1975 Investigations Hearing, supra note 12, at 13. 
48. The only authority to issue orders explicitly granted in the EPAA permits the Presi-
dent, or his delegate, to require adjustments in the allocation of petroleum products. See 15 
U.S.C. § 753(c)(3), (4) (1976). 
49. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text. 
50. One commentator claims that the incorporation of§ 209 of the ESA in the EPAA 
established a "restitutionary obligation" on the energy agency administering the EPAA. See 
Note, Collecting Overcharges from the Oil Companies: 'Ine .Department of Energy's Restitution-
ary Obligation, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1039, 1042-43 (1980). However, the author does not explain 
how a grant of power to a court is transfused into an agency's mandate. The legislative history 
indicates that Congress added the language to § 209 simply to "[make) clear that the court has 
power to grant restitution." S. REP. No. 507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1971) U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2283, 2291 (emphasis added). 
As used in this Note, compensation refers to actual repayment to overcharge victims. It is 
more in the nature of damages than in restitution, requinng both disgorgement of wrongfully 
obtained proceeds and repayment. Restitution, on the other hand, is a broader concept. Com-
mentators are in general agreement that the principal thrust of restitution is the disgorgement 
of unjust enrichment rather than compensating the person wronged. See D. DOBBS, HAND• 
BOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 4.1, at 224 (1973); 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITU· 
TION, § 1.1, at 4 (1978); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION§ 1 (1937). Therefore, 
premising EPAA enforcement on a restitutionary obligation under ESA § 209 does not neces-
sariy require refunds to overcharged customers. See Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. 
O'Leary, 499 F. Supp. 871, 885-88 (S.D. Ala. 1980). Restitutionary remedies thereby avoid the 
difficulties inherent in identifying wronged individuals. See 499 F. Supp. at 885-86. 
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Act of 1974 (FEAA)51 did not explicitly empower the agency to or-
der refunds to consumers. The FEAA did direct the FEA to pro-
mote the "stability [of] energy prices to the consumer."52 But the 
Act's legislative history indicates that this admonition did not ex-
pand the FEA's enforcement powers.53 
Notwithstanding this apparent paucity of authority, the FEA 
continued to shift away from remedies that were merely restitution-
ary towards those that compensated victims.54 In 1975 the agency 
promulgated its last major amendment to the remedies regulations.55 
The FEA's explanation of the amendment demonstrates that the 
agency viewed compensatory remedies as obligatory: 
The principal aim of these amendments is to make clear that the 
PEA can and will continue to provide meaningful relief from the ef-
fects of price overcharges, even if price controls should expire. To al-
low the PEA to carry out its enforcement responsibilities effectively, it 
is necessary to utilize appropriate means to insure that refunds are 
channeled directly to the ultimate consumers who, in the end, bear the 
brunt of price overcharges.56 
The FEA committed itself to requiring "by order whatever action is 
necessary on the part of offenders and downstream resellers to as-
sure, to the extent possible, that refunds and rollbacks flow to those 
persons who were the victims of the overcharge."57 To achieve this 
goal, the amendment augmented the remedies available in FEA re-
medial orders to include interest payments on past overcharges, and 
refunds to consumers who lacked privity with the price violator. 58 
The FEA's use of its remedial order authority was strictly com-
pensatory. 59 In Shell Oil Company, 60 for example, the FEA stated 
51. See note 27 supra. 
52. 15 u.s.c. § 764(b)(5) (1976). 
53. See note 38 supra. 
54. See note 50 supra. 
55. See 40 Fed. Reg. 40,141 (1975) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 205.195 (1976) (amended 
1979)). These regulations remained unchanged until the Department of Energy recodified 
them. Compare 10 C.F.R. § 205.195 (1978), with 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.190-.1991 (1979). 
56. 40 Fed. Reg. 40,141, 40,142 (1975) (statement of David G. Wilson, FEA Acting Gen-
eral Counsel). 
57. Id (emphasis added). Compensatory remedies assume sole importance in remedial 
orders upon the termination of price controls because enforcement actions no longer need 
deter future violations. 
58. 10 C.F.R. § 205.195(a) (1976) (amended 1979). These regulations also authorized re-
funds effected through price rollbacks below the ceiling price. 
59. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (5 FEA) 
~ 80,627 (1977) (refund to identified customers based on their volumetric purchases); Atlantic 
Richfield Co., [1976 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (4 FEA) ~ 80,536 (1976) (refund to 
identified customer); Potomac Gas Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (3 
FEA) ~ 80,634 (1976) (refunds through prospective price reduction). By mid-1975, the FEA 
had returned $77.8 million in "specific refunds to individual customers and rollbacks." 1975 
Investigations Hearing, supra note 12, at 44 (testimony of Gorman C. Smith). 
The FEA's remedial orders responded to two distinct effects of price violations - the in-
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that "[t]he benefit of the remedial action should inure wherever pos-
sible to the category of purchaser that was overcharged .... "61 
Recognizing that compensation was not always feasible, the agency 
concluded that it was obligated to determine "the manner in which 
[the compensatory] objectives can be best furthered in the particular 
case under consideration."62 Skelly Oil Company 63 is particularly in-
jury to the consumer and the unjust enrichment of the price violator. See note 50supra. Obvi-
ously, the FEA could redress these effects only to the extent of its congressionally delegated 
autp.ority. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J,, 
concurring). Thus, the FEA's compensatory efforts had to be directed at furthering the pur-
pose of the EPAA- "minimizing the adverse impacts of [petroleum] shortages or dislocations 
on the American people and the domestic economy." 15 U.S.C. § 751(b) (1976). Compensa-
tion of overcharged consumers is one method ofminimizine an adverse impact on "the Ameri-
can people." Disgorgement of unjust enrichment furthers the purpose of the Act to the extent 
that it deters future violations. A third compensable effect might be the disruption caused to 
the economy itself by the price violation; however, this effect is so complex that it is difficult to 
imagine a meaningful remedy. 
The FEA's remedial orders typically served both the compensatory and restitutionary pur-
poses. For example, an order that required a refund to an identified purchaser disgorges the 
unjust enrichment and compensates the victim. See Atlantic Richfield Co., (1976 Transfer 
Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (4 FEA) ~ 80,536 (1976). Incomplete compensation occurred in 
the FEA's "refunds to the marketplace." When the identity of the overcharged parties was 
difficult to ascertain, the FEA required the price violator to refund the overcharge to the mar-
ketplace by reducing the price of future sales below the maximum allowable price. See, e.g., 
Shell Oil Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (4 FEA) ~ 80,545 (1976), revd. 
on other grounds, 440 F. Supp. 876 (D. Del. 1977), qffd., 574 F.2d 512 (femp. Erner. Ct. App. 
1978). 
This remedy fulfilled the restitutionary objective, but failed to fulfill completely the com-
pensatory objective. Nevertheless, this remedy did have a compensatory element in the form 
of compensation to a "fluid class" of consumers that to some degree included actual 
overcharged purchasers. The fluid class recovery is characterized by a distribution of an ag-
gregate award to a "class as a whole," in lieu of identifying the individual parties actually 
injured and awarding each his deserved compensation. See generally Malina, T/1e Search for 
the Pot of Gold.· Fluid Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 41 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 301 (1972); 1 CLASS Acr. REP. 70 (1972). For discussions of the shortcomings of fluid 
class remedies as compensatory tools, see Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 58-
59 (D.N.J. 1971); Note, The Cy Pres Solution to the .Damage .Distribution Problems of Mass 
Class Actions, 9 GA. L. REV. 893 (1975); Comment, Manageability of Notice and .Damage Cal-
culation in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MICH. L. REV. 338, 363-75 (1971). 
Despite these problems with fluid class recoveries and the method's questionable legality, 
see Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 72 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
968 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 84 F.R.D. 100, 114 (E,D. 
Va. 1980); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119, 1137 (W.D. Pa. 1974), revd. 
on other grounds, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976); Bill Mmnielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. 
Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381, 388 (S.D. Ohio 1973), the fluid class refund repre-
sented the FEA's best attempt to compensate the victims of overcharges. Nevertheless, at least 
one court refused to permit the DOE to use such a remedy. See United States v. Ringer & 
Ringer Enterprises, 492 F. Supp. 350 (D. Colo. 1980) (discussed at note 65 infra). 
60. (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (3 FEA) ~ 80,545 (1976), revd. on 
other grounds, 440 F. Supp. 876 (D. Del. 1977), qffd., 574 F.2d 512 (femp. Erner. Ct. App. 
1978). 
61. (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (3 FEA) at 80,691. Accord, Tenneco 
Oil Co., (1976-1977 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (5 FEA) ~ 80,506, at 80,533 (1976); 
Skelly Oil Co., (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (3 FEA) ~ 80,603, at 80,889 
(1976). 
62. Shell Oil Co., (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (3 FEA) at 80,691. 
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structive. There the PEA's Office of Hearings and Appeals vacated a 
remedial order that failed to return to victims the precise amount of 
the overcharge that they had incurred because the order did not 
demonstrate that a strict compensation requirement was inappropri-
ate in the particular case. 64 
Thus, when Congress considered the DOEA in 1977, the power 
and the obligation of the PEA to order consumer remedies had 
become firmly embedded in practice. 65 Responding to congressional 
demands, the PEO had found authority in the EP AA to order con-
sumer remedies. Under further pressure from Congress, the PEA 
interpreted the EPAA not only to authorize, but to mandate such 
remedies. This administrative construction of the EP AA is presump-
tively correct. 66 The Supreme Court has held that "congressional 
See Tenneco Oil Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (5 FEA) ~ 80,506, at 
80,533 (1976). 
63. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (3 FEA) ~ 80,603 (1976). 
64. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGMT. (CCH) (3 FEA) at 80,889. See FEDERAL 
ENERGY ADMINISTRATION TASK FORCE ON COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, SUMMARY OF 
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS V-4 (July 14, 1977) (recommending that the FEA order 
refunds to the Treasury, but only in those instances where remedial measures are unable to 
compensate injured parties). 
65. The FEA's authority to order refunds to identifiable overcharged consumers was sub-
sequently upheld in Bonray Oil Co. v. DOE, 472 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Okla. 1978), ajfd., 601 
F.2d 1191 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1979). However, United States v. Ringer & Ringer Enter-
prises, 492 F. Supp. 350 (D. Colo. 1980), held that refunds to the marketplace are beyond the 
authority granted under the EPAA. 
The Bonray court's reasoning is subject to criticism. For example, Bonray claims that the 
FEA's refund authority could be derived from the broad powers conveyed by the EPAA. 472 
F. Supp. at 903-04. But although broad powers were conveyed under the Act to regulate the 
supply of petroleum, enforcement provisions were specifically defined. See text at notes 22-25 
supra. Bonray also claims that the CLC exercised similar refund powers, citing University of 
S. Cal. v. Cost of Living Council, 472 F.2d 1065 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 410 
U.S. 928 (1973). However, this case did not involve a remedial order; instead, the suit involved 
a declaratory judgment to prevent the CLC from initiating a court suit under § 209 of the ESA. 
472 F.2d at 1065-68. The CLC did have remedial order regulations, see 6 C.F.R. §§ 155.81-.87 
(1974), but the validity of these regulations were themselves never fully tested in court. Fi-
nally, Bonray's argument that Congress ratified the FEA's refund procedures simply by ex-
tending the duration of the EPAA is unconvincing, in light of the fact that these extensions 
were temporary, and enacted in a pro forma manner simply to prevent the price control pro-
gram from lapsing without the institution of an alternative program. C.f. Tennessee Valley 
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (refusal to imply congressional repeal of the Endangered 
Species Act with respect to a particular dam by continued appropriations to build the dam). 
The Ringer decision is not beyond criticism as well. In Ringer, the court accepted the 
Bonray holding that energy agencies can order the refund of overcharges through remedial 
orders. However, the court limited the refunds to identifiable purchasers. 492 F. Supp. at 352. 
The court reasoned, first, that the agency is limited to restitution by § 209 of the ESA, and 
second, that "restitution means restoration to the rightful owner." 492 F. Supp. at 352. Both 
of these contentions are questionable. As previously noted,§ 209 deals strictly with court rem-
edies, and has no application to agency remedial orders. See note 50 supra. Moreover, com-
mentators generally agree that the purpose of restitution is the disgorgement of unjust 
enrichment, rather than restoration to the rightful owner. Id. 
66. Courts have often looked to the "contemporaneous construction" of a statute by the 
agency charged with enforcement when interpreting statutes. See 2 K. DA VIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE§ 7.14 (2d ed. 1979); 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON· 
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failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive 
evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress."67 
Congress had ample opportunity to condemn the agencies' interpre-
tations of the EPAA,68 but did not. And Congress's role in inducing 
the agencies to provide consumer remedies69 contradicts any inf er-
ence that congressional silence proceeded from ignorance rather 
than acquiescence.70 This combination of circumstances strongly 
STRUCTION §§ 49.01-.10 (4th ed. 1973). The contemporaneous construction doctrine has been 
applied in past determinations of FEA's authority. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FEA, 566 F.2d 87 
(Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1977); Bonray v. DOE, 472 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Okla. 1978), ajfd., 601 
F.2d 1191 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1979). 
The strength of the presumption will depend on three underlying elements. See C. SANDS, 
supra, at § 49.04. Courts first consider the reliability of the interpreting body. Those who 
manage the day-to-day workings of the statute are given the most latitude in their interpreta-
tions, id. at 49.05, particularly if they are implementing a new statute. See Norwegian Nitro-
gen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933). Where more than one agency 
concur, the presumption is likewise strengthened. See Clarkson Constr. Co. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Commn., 531 F.2d 451, 457 (10th Cir. 1976). Second, the weight 
given to an interpretation increases with its longevity. See, e.g., NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 
67, 74-75 (1973). Third, closeness in time between the statute's enactment and the agency's 
interpretation affects the weight given to the interpretation. See C. SANDS, supra, at§ 49.08. 
Courts assume that the agency was more likely to be aware of Congress's intent if the interpre-
tation closely followed enactment. See Brennan v. Kroger Co., 513 F.2d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 
1975); Brennan v. General Tel. Co., 488 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Applying these elements to the EPAA, the agency constructions should be afforded great 
probative force. Both energy agencies were charged with enforcing a new and complex statute. 
Though neither agency could have provided input to Congress before enactment of the EP AA, 
both had significant and ongoing contact with Congress while initially administering the Act. 
The elapsed time between the enactment of the EPAA and the adoption of the final set of 
regulations, see note 27 supra, does not seem unusual considering the complexity of the regu-
lated industry. Only the length-of-time element does not support giving great weight to the 
agencies' interpretation. Neither, however, does it tend to reduce the weight of the construc-
tion, since it is hard to imagine reliance by any party on EPAA remedial regulations. The 
regulations establish a process for distributing remedies, not whether remedies will be paid. 
Therefore the violator should be ambivalent to the regulation; only the beneficiaries have an 
interest. Granting this interest, there is no incentive for the potential beneficiary to alter his 
behavior prospectively in the expectation of a refund as opposed to a price rollback. See gener-
ally United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 461 F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 1972), 
modified, 411 U.S. 655 (1973); C. SANDS, supra, at § 49.07 (indicating that the time element 
goes primarily to reliance by persons subject to the rule). 
67. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (footnote omitted). E.g., Loril-
lard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 
(1975). 
68. EPAA has been reenacted or modified three times, most recently in December 1975. 
See note 27 supra. 
69. See notes 33-47 supra and accompanying text. 
These circumstances stand in sharp contrast to casc;s where contemporaneous constructions 
have been rejected. The FEA "made known its views to Congress in committee hearings" on 
"a matter of public record and discussion." Cf. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192, 194 (1969) 
(where there was no evidence of congressional agreement in committee hearings or that the 
interpretation had been a matter of public record). The FEA's compensatory objective was 
heard and supported in five separate committee hearings dealing specifically with EPAA en-
forcement, and did not merely appear in "a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages 
of legislative documents." Cf. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978) (small number of iso-
lated statements in lengthy legislative history insufficient to create inference of ratification). 
70. Indeed, the memories of the hearings at which Congress demanded compensation for 
the victims of overcharges appear to have been fresh in the minds of senators in 1977. See 123 
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supports a conclusion that Congress ratified the agencies' .finding 
that the EP AA imposed a compensatory obligation when it enacted 
the DOEA.71 
Despite abundant evidence of congressional intent to provide 
consumer remedies, courts may be wary of .finding an implied ratifi-
cation of a compensatory obligation. It is not uncommon for agen-
cies to interpret their own authority expansively, and implying 
congressional ratification may expand the agency's authority beyond 
what Congress intended.72 Thus, in SEC v. Sloan,73 the Supreme 
Court recently refused to find implied ratification of the agency's in-
terpretation of its enforcement power because such a .finding would 
vest "far reaching," ''virtually untrammeled," and ''unreviewable 
power" in the agency.74 However, no such problem exists for a court 
that affirms the agencies' conclusion that they operated under a com-
pensatory obligation. Indeed, such ratification would prevent the 
DOE from "dol[ing] out, by 'whim and caprice,' money that right-
fully belongs to other[s]."75 Imposing a compensatory obligation is 
thus consistent with the Supreme Court's practice of construing dele-
gations of authority to agencies in a manner that avoids "open-
ended grants" of administrative power. 76 
An examination of the specific provisions of the DOEA further 
evinces the existence of a compensatory obligation. Section 50377 of 
CONG. REC. 15,295 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (referring to 1975 Separation of Powers 
Hearing, supra note 41). 
71. The Supreme Court has not established a clear test for finding ratifications of agency 
constructions. Two essential elements, however, typically underlie a finding of ratification: 
knowledge of the contemporaneous construction, see SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119-22 
(1978); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969); Kay v. FCC, 443 F.2d 638, 646-47 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), and the absence of any indication of a contrary congressional intent, see Bingler v. 
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969); Massachusetts Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assoc. v. 
United States, 377 U.S. 235, 241 (1964). Both of these elements are present in the case of DOE 
remedial orders. After finding congressional ratification of a contemporaneous construction, 
courts will also consider the effect of the construction on the scope of agency power. Courts 
should be on guard against attempts by agencies to bootstrap themselves into new areas and 
expand their power beyond what Congress intended. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. at 119 (quot-
ing FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973)); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. United 
States, 91 F.2d 973,976 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 768 (1938). Rather than increase 
agency power, a requirement that remedies must compensate the victims of overcharges to the 
extent feasible strictly limits agency discretion. 
72. q: F.W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 973, 976 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 
302 U.S. 768 (1938) ("[t]o suppose that Congress must particularly correct each mistaken con-
struction under penalty of incorporating it into the fabric of the statute appears to us unwar-
ranted"). 
73. 436 U.S. 103 (1978). 
74. 436 U.S. at 121. 
75. EN. MNGMT. (CCH) No. 404 at 2, Oct. 21, 1980, (quoting Milton Socolar, General 
Counsel of the General Accounting Office, describing DOE remedial procedures). 
76. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 
(1980) (plurality). 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7193 (Supp. III 1979). 
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the Act dispelled any doubt regarding the DOE's authority to issue 
remedial orders to enforce the price control regulations promulgated 
under the EP AA. Section 503 explicitly authorizes the issuance of 
such orders, subject to specific procedural requirements.78 Although 
neither section 503 nor the legislative history defines "remedial or-
der," this Note argues that Congress intended these orders to com-
pensate injured consumers whenever feasible. 
"Remedial order'' is a term of art that Congress has employed 
only in the DOEA.79 In using this term, Congress most likely con-
templated a certain type of "remedial order," and did not intend to 
grant the DOE unfettered discretion. In the energy price control 
field, "remedial order'' had by 1977 become synonymous with "con-
sumer remedy."80 This restrictive definition of "remedial order" had 
evolved in response to congressional demands for compensation of 
the actual victims of overcharges. It is therefore reasonable to as-
sume that section 503 authorized only remedies that achieved the 
greatest possible amount of compensation under all the circum-
stances. Nothing in section 503's legislative history indicates that the 
DOE's remedial orders could ignore the FEA's compensatory obli-
gation. Congress enacted secton 503 not to enlarge agency remedial 
powers, but rather to guarantee the observance of procedural due 
process in agency proceedings. 81 Thus, section 503 should not be 
interpreted to authorize new types of noncompensatory remedies 
when its sole purpose was to correct procedural deficiencies in the 
exercise of the Department's compensatory remedial power. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the DOE is required to issue 
compensatory rather than merely restitutionary remedial orders can 
be found in the Department's own regulations. These regulations 
appear to authorize only compensatory remedies. 82 Seeking to im-
78. Section 503 permits the Secretary of the DOE to issue a remedial order upon belief 
"that a person has violated any regulation, rule or order ... promulgated pursuant to the 
EPAA." 42 U.S.C. § 7193(a) (Supp. III 1979). The section specified further the form of the 
hearing, and provisions for intra-agency review. 42 U.S.C. § 7193(c) (Supp. III 1979). 
79. A Lexis search of the United States Code was run for "remedial order." The search 
covered only the current Code, but this qualification of the statement in text should not affect 
this Note's argument. Several other federal agencies are authorized to issue what are essen-
tially remedial orders. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 11,702-,705 (Supp. III 1979) (Interstate Com-
merce Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976) (Federal Power Commission). 
80. See text at notes 59-63 supra. 
81. See 123 CONG. REC. 15,295 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits); 123 CONG. REC, 15,297 
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Stone); 123 CONG. REc. 17,402 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 85, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 956. 
82. See IO C.F.R. § 205.1991 (1980); Letter from Milton Socolar, supra note 14, at 6: 
In our opinion, each of the specified remedies is designed to force the violator of the 
regulation to remit its unlawful gains and for the customers of the violator to recover the 
amounts they have been overcharged, if possible. The regulation does not permit Energy 
to order "any action," but rather only "such other action" - that is, action similar to the 
specified remedies - which will eliminate or compensate for the effects of the violation. 
The further definition of "such action" makes it clear that its purpose should be to force 
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prove upon its ability to provide consumer refunds, the DOE initi-
ated a special claims procedure applicable to "those situations in 
which the Department . . . is unable to readily identify persons who 
are entitled to refunds . . . or to readily ascertain the amounts that 
such persons are entitled to receive."83 The regulations specify de-
tailed procedures for disposing of amounts received in settlements 
that cannot be returned to injured consumers. 84 There can be little 
doubt that the DOE felt obligated to provide consumer remedies 
when it promulgated these regulations. 
The evidence thus indicates that the interaction of Congress and 
the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the EP AA has 
imposed upon the DOE a compensatory obligation. Part I traced the 
evolution of this obligation from its inception in 1974 to its fruition 
in the DOEA and beyond. A court that carefully examined the con-
fused history of petroleum price controls could find that the compen-
satory policies of the FEO and the FEA matured into a 
compensatory obligation at one of two points. The obligation may 
have arisen in 1975, when Congress reenacted the EPAA after 
agency interpretations of the Act had appeared to mandate compen-
sation. If not, Congress's authorization in the DOEA of "remedial 
orders," which had become closely associated with consumer reme-
dies, elevated compensation from a factor to be considered to a stat-
utory obligation. Part II will evaluate the DOE's success in 
achieving this compensatory ideal, and calls for radical change in the 
Department's remedial order strategy. 
II. THE DOE'S ABNEGATION OF ITS 
COMPENSATORY OBLIGATION 
The DOE refuses to recognize an obligation to return disgorged 
funds to persons actually overcharged. Instead, the Department 
treats compensation as one factor among "many other factors [to be] 
considered in the negotiations of the proposed consent order."85 
Without regard to a compensatory obligation, the DOE has distrib-
uted the proceeds of consent orders86 to persons and purposes wholly 
the violator to remit overcharges and, if possible, to return them to the customers who 
have actually been overcharged. 
83. 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.280-.288 (1980). 
84. See 10 C.F.R. § 205.287(c) (1980). 
Recent statements by DOE officials also support this Note's conclusion. See 1981 Hearings, 
supra note 3, at 101 (statement of Abrom Landesman, Acting Special Counsel for Compliance 
of the DOE) ("What ••. [consumers] need is to be compensated for the prior overcharge. 
That's what these programs are intended to do."). 
85. Action on Consent Order with Phillips Petroleum Co., 45 Fed. Reg. 1934, 1935 (1980). 
86. Consent orders, see 10 C.F.R. § 205.199J(a) (1980), have become the DOE's preferred 
remedy because they are less costly and time-consuming than other remedies. See GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 31; REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRUDE OIL RESELLER PRICE CONTROLS 
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unrelated to the compromised overcharges. For example, 175 mil-
lion dollars of the DO E's claimed settlement of "200 million dollars 
in remedies" in Phillips Petroleum Co. 87 were retained by the com-
pany for refinery expansion and reduction in banked costs. Only 
three million dollars were returned to purchasers of Phillips prod-
ucts. In Getty Oil Co. , the DOE authorized the distribution of 
twenty-five million dollars in disgorged overcharges to low-income 
persons and military personnel without regard to whether these per-
sons were the. victims of overcharges. 88 And in Standard Oil Co. (In-
diana), only twenty-nine million dollars of the total settlement of 
690 million dollars were allocated to purchasers, and then only to 
purchasers of tank car quantities.89 Although the DOE has recently 
made a greater effort to compensate injured consumers,90 and the 
DOE's remedial policy is in a state offlux,91 the Department appears 
to have reversed long-standing FEO and FEA policies, and has 
made noncompensatory orders the norm.92 
The DOE has instituted these noncompensatory remedies 
through the issuance of consent orders. These orders represent a 
compromise between the DOE and the alleged price violator.93 The 
(1979). Fourteen consent orders were issued by DOE in 1979, twelve in 1980, and nine had 
been proposed in 1981, as of March 13. Most of the firms involved were among the largest oil 
companies. See Fed. Reg. Annual Index 1979, at 40; Fed. Reg. Annual Index 1980; Fed. Reg. 
Cumulative Index Jan.-Mar. 1981, at 17. 
These consent orders have ''the same force and effect as a Remedial Order," and "may 
require one or more of the remedies" authorized for use in remedial orders. 10 C.F.R. 
§ 205.1991 (b) (1980). DOE regulation 205.1991 specifies the particular remedies available for 
use in both remedial orders and consent orders. Thus, it makes clear that the term "may" as 
used above simply empowers the DOE to use the same remedies in consent orders that are 
available for use in remedial orders, and does not permit the DOE to use remedies in consent 
orders that are unavailable for use in remedial orders. Consequently, the DOE's consent or-
ders, like its remedial orders, must use remedies that fulfill the DO E's compensatory obligation 
to overcharged purchasers. 
87. 45 Fed. Reg. 1934, 1935 (1980). 
88. 45 Fed. Reg. 9992, 9992-93 (1980). 
However, the Comptroller General of the United States has issued an advisory memoran-
dum to Congressman John Dingell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, 
stating that the Getty Consent Order is illegal because of its noncompensatory nature. Letter 
from Milton Socolar, supra note 14. 
89. 45 Fed. Reg. 26,747, 26,748 (1980). 
90. See, e.g., Upham Oil & Gas Co.; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,474, 
28,474 (1981); Marbob Energy Corp; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,473, 
28,473 (1981); Cibro Gasoline Corp.; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,472, 
28,472 (1981); Lyons Petroleum Inc.; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,680, 
26,680 (1981); Aminoil U.S.A., Inc.; Proposed Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 23,970, 23,970 
(1981). But the DOE continues to assert that bank reduction is an appropriate remedy 
notwithstanding the decontrol of petroleum prices. See, e.g., Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co.; 
Action on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,497, 29,499 (1981). 
91. See, e.g., ll.S. Finds Oil Overcharge Money Hard to Give Back, Wash. Post, June 23, 
1981, § A, at II, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Overcharge Mon~]. The various offices within the 
DOE are apparently divided over the proper disposition of disgorged overcharges. See EN, 
MNGMT. (CCH), Aug. II, 1981, at 4. 
92. For example, in the recent Chevron "global" consent order, Chevron agreed to deliver 
one million barrels of crude oil to the strategic oil reserve as a partial settlement of the alleged 
price control violations. 1 EN. MNGMT. (CCH) ~ 9291 (1981). See generally Ten Oil Concerns 
Settle Charges of Overpricing, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1981, at 17, col. 1. 
....... ry_ - u,,.. y:, n t.t ..,nc 1aOT/".1\ /10R.n,. nntP. Rli _t•unrn. 
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Department's decision to enter a consent order rather than litigate 
the remedial order is arguably a matter of prosecutorial discretion.94 
However, the DOE's own regulations require that consent orders 
utilize only those remedies that are available for use in remedial or-
ders.95 In choosing among the available remedies, therefore, the 
DOE must select the remedy that best compensates persons injured 
by the overcharges.96 
Tested against this standard, most of the major consent orders 
entered thus far would fail. Refinery expansion and banked cost re-
ductions accounted for more than one half of the dollar value of the 
first four billion dollars in settlements.97 But refinery expansion is 
not even intended to compensate victims, and the effect of bank re-
ductions was questionable even prior to deregulation.98 When it al-
lows companies to settle violations by adding refinery capacity or 
reducing banks, the DOE ignores both its statutory obligation and its 
own regulations.99 Nevertheless, the DOE has continued to defend 
and utilize such "remedies."100 
When the Department has attempted to compensate victims, its 
94. See Action on Safety & Health v. FrC, 498 F.2d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Local 282, 
Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1964). But see K. DAVIS, supra 
note 66, at § 8.15. 
95. See note 86 supra. 
96. See Part I supra. 
91. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-44. 
98. See note 12 supra. 
99. See note 82 supra. 10 C.F.R. § 205.199l(a) (1980), provides: 
A Remedial Order, a Remedial Order for Immediate Compliance, an Order of Disal-
lowance, or a Consent Order may require the person to whom it is directed to roll back 
prices, to make refunds equal to the amount (plus interest) charged in excess of those 
amounts permitted under DOE Regulations, to make appropriate compensation to third 
persons for administrative expenses of effectuating appropriate remedies, and to take such 
other action as the DOE determines is necessary to eliminate or to compensate for the 
effects of a violation or any cost disallowance pursuant to § 212.83 or § 212.84. Such 
action may include a direction to the person to whom the Order is issued to establish an 
escrow account or take other measures to make refunds directly to purchasers of the prod-
ucts involved, notwithstanding the fact that those purchasers obtained such products from 
an intermediate distributor of such person's products, and may require as part of the 
remedy that the person to whom the Order is issued maintain his prices at certain desig-
nated levels, notwithstanding the presence or absence of other regulatory controls on such 
person's prices. In cases where purchasers cannot be reasonably identified or paid or 
where the amount of each purchaser's overcharge is incapable of reasonable determina-
tion, the DOE may refund the amounts received in such cases directly to the Treasury of 
the United States on behalf of such purchasers. 
Although the DOE claims that it may authorize any remedy necessary to eliminate or 
compensate for the effects of a violation, see Letter from Milton Socolar, supra note 14, at 6, 
the language of its regulation provides only ''weak support . . . for the expansive authority it 
asserts." Id 
100. See Tenneco Oil Co.; Action on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,499, 29,501 (1981) 
(defended bank reduction but withdrew consent order provisions using that remedy; no substi-
tute remedy); Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.; Action on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 
29,497, 29,497-99 (1981) (consent order including bank reduction); Action on Consent Order 
with Koch Indus., Inc., 46 Fed. Reg. 24,291, 24,293 (1981) (defended bank reduction but with-
drew consent order provision using that remedy; no substitute remedy). 
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remedies have not been notably successful. Cash settlements with 
price violators have often been in the form of payments to an escrow 
account established by the DOE.101 But the Department has failed 
to develop a workable distribution strategy to achieve compensa-
tion, 102 and it seems unlikely that average consumers will benefit 
from this remedy. 103 When the Department has distributed these 
funds, it too often has done so with complete disregard to its com-
pensatory obligation and its regulations. 104 
The DOE has also relied on price rollbacks to compensate in-
jured consumers. 105 Although the DOE was unable to "assure itself 
that the customers getting the price rollbacks [were] actually injured 
parties,"106 rollbacks may have been the remedy that best compen-
sated consumers. 107 After deregulation, however, price rollbacks are 
not an appropriate remedial measure. 108 
Many consent orders have provided for direct refunds to injured 
consumers, 109 but this remedy has been criticized as well. The 
DOE's audits generally do not identify specific customers who were 
overcharged, 110 and this limits the Department's ability to compen-
sate injured parties. 111 The GAO has concluded that it will not be 
feasible for the DOE to develop practical means to identify injured 
parties or the amounts of injuries.112 It recommends that the DOE 
allow refunds only when it can be certain that only actual victims are 
compensated. Under the GAO's approach, the DOE would make 
101. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 47. 
102. Id. Of the $350 million currently available in escrow accounts, only $5.3 million has 
been disbursed, and the validity of all of these disbursements has been called into question. 
See EN. MNGMT. (CCH), Aug. 11, 1981, at 4. 
103. See Overcharge Money, supra note 91. 
104. See, e.g., notes 9-11 supra. The DO E's regulations established a special refund proce-
dure that allows consumers to apply for refunds whenever the Department "is unable to read-
ily identify persons who are entitled to refunds . . . or . . . ascertain the amounts that such 
persons are entitled to receive." 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.280 (1980). See 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.280-,288 
(1980); note 83 supra. The GAO has criticized the DOE for failing to use these procedures. 
See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 44; Letter from Milton Socolar, supra note 14, at 11. 
Several recent consent orders have utilized the special refund provisions. See, e.g., James B. 
Kite Operating Co.; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,852 (1981); Gas Engine 
& Compressor Serv.; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (1981); Marbob 
Energy Corp.; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,473 (1981). 
105. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 45. 
106. Id 
107. See note 59 supra. 
108. See Implementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,681, 26,683 
(1981); Action on Consent Order with Koch Indus., Inc., 46 Fed. Reg. 24,291, 24,292 (1981); 
GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 45. 
109. E.g., Action on Consent Order with Koch Indus., Inc., 46 Fed. Reg. 24,291, 24,291 
(1981). See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-46. 
110. See Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co.; Action on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,497, 
29,498 (1981). 
ll l. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 44. 
112. Id at 51. 
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more extensive use of its special refund procedures, 113 and deposit 
any remaining funds in the United States Treasury.114 The Reagan 
Administration is currently considering this proposal, 115 and recent 
consent orders indicate that this plan may become popular.116 
It is doubtful, however, that this plan would satisfy an agency 
committed to distributing refunds to the whole of the class of 
overcharged purchasers. The GAO's proposal may compensate 
large purchasers, who will be able to document their damages, but it 
is unlikely to benefit the average consumer directly. 117 As the DOE 
has observed, however: 
[t]he fact that claims to specific refunds may not have been proven does 
not mean that injury has not occurred. Rather, the absence of claims 
for the full amount of the settlement would tend to reflect the difficulty 
inherent in filing a valid claim. Thus, an attempt should be made to 
identify the classes of ultimate consumers which are entitled to receive 
portions of the refunds. This will accomplish the objective of distribut-
ing the bulk of the fund remaining to those injured parties for whom 
the filing or processing of individual claims is not possible or is not 
administratively efficient. 118 
The DOE has also recognized that remedies based upon a variant of 
the "fluid class" recovery scheme119 are more likely to compensate 
injured consumers than are distributions to the Treasury.12° First, . . 
113. See notes 83 & l04supra. 
114. GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 51, 52. 
115. Overcharge Money, supra note 91. 
116. See, e.g., Independent Oil & Tire Co.; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 
30,852, 30,853 (1981); Mallard Resources, Inc.; Action Taken on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 
28,472 (1981). For example, in Independent Oil, the DOE stated: 
The DOE intends to distribute the refund amounts in a just and equitable manner in 
accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Accordingly, distribution of such re-
funded overcharges requires that only those "persons" [as defined at 10 C.F.R. § 205.2] 
who actually suffered a loss as a result of the transactions described in the Consent Order 
receive appropriate refunds. Because of the petroleum industry's complex marketing sys-
tem, it is likely that overcharges have either been passed through as higher prices to subse-
quent purchasers or offset. In fact, the adverse effects of the overcharges may have 
become so diffused that it is a practical impossibility to identify specific adversely affected 
persons, in which case disposition of the refunds will be made in the general public inter-
est by an appropriate means such as payment to the Treasury of the United States pursu-
ant to 10 C.F.R. 20.199l(a). 
46 Fed. Reg. at 30,853 (emphasis added). 
117. See Overcharge Money, supra note 91. 
118. Implementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,681, 26,684 (1981) 
(emphasis added). 
119. See note 59 supra. 
120. Refunds to the Treasury have several advantages. First, this alternative involves vir-
tually no administrative expenses. Implementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 26,681, 26,685 (1981). Second, the remedy would benefit the public at large by increasing 
federal revenues and reducing the need to borrow. 46 Fed. Reg. at 26,685; Overcharge Money, 
supra note 91. "As the class of people injured by the alleged overcharges is also essentially the 
public at large, such a system would serve the purpose ofbenefitting those injured parties." 46 
Fed. Reg. at 26,685. 
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the nature of the benefits conferred by fluid-class distributions is 
"more closely correlated with the nature of the injuries incurred than 
it would be in the case of a Treasury refund."121 Second, the benefits 
conferred "to each consumer of refined products would be more 
closely correlated with the amount of injury that consumer incurred 
than it would in the case of a Treasury refund."122 
Several general principles, therefore, should guide the DOE 
when designing consent orders. First, neither congressional enact-
ments nor the agency's regulations authorize noncompensatory rem-
edies.123 Second, identifiable purchasers who can demonstrate that 
they purchased products sold by the alleged violator and that they 
did not pass on the overcharges to subsequent customers should have 
first claim to refund money.124 Third, the DOE should use its special 
expertise to develop disbursement schemes whereby the remaining 
funds are distributed to groups of ultimate consumers who were 
likely to have borne a portion of the overcharges.125 The fact that 
such plans do not compensate all injured consumers, or provide 
small windfalls to other consumers, should not be dispositive. What 
is required is that the DOE use its best efforts to design consent or-
121. Implementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,681, 26,685. Because 
the injuries resulted from increased energy costs, compensation in the form of lower energy or 
energy-related costs seems more appropriate than compensation in the form of decreased truces 
or government services. 46 Fed. Reg. at 26,685. 
122. Implementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,681, 26,685. Over-
charges injure consumers in proportion to their usage of refined products, and fluid-class reme-
dies "operate in proportion to their consumption of energy. In contrast, a Treasury refund 
may unduly benefit certain classes of people, since the benefits each individual receives from 
government expenditures have no discernible correlation with his or her relative energy con-
sumption." 46 Fed. Reg. at 26,685. 
123. See Part I and notes 82 & 99 supra. 
124. Implementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,681, 26,682 (1981). 
See Implementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 17,643, 17,646 (1981); Imple-
mentation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 15,320, 15,323 (1981). 
In some cases, of course, purchasers that passed on overcharges may also be well equipped 
to pass on refunds to ultimate consumers. See note 125 i,ifra. 
125. See Implementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,681, 26,684; Im-
plementation of Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 17,643, 17,64 ; Implementation of 
Special Refund Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 15,320, 15,323. 
The DOE's proposed distribution plan for a case involving 25 different firms and $21 mil-
lion in consent order funds is instructive. The order gave priority to identifiable purchasers 
who could prove their damage. Anticipating that most inJured parties would be unable to 
document their losses, the DOE provided for apportionment of the remaining funds among the 
states based on each state's proportionate usage of crude oil products between 1973 and 1978, 
the period when the alleged overcharges occurred. The proposed order divided the money to 
be apportioned to each state into three pools, reflecting motor gasoline usage, usage of other 
refined products in the transportation sector, and all other consumption of refined products. 
Within each pool the proceeds would be allocated to organizations best suited to pass through 
the refunds to the parties injured by the overcharges. 46 Fed. Reg. at 26,681. The DOE con-
cluded that the proposed plan would benefit all consumers of refined products nationwide (the 
injured class in the cases), would provide for refunds in rough proportion to their usage of 
petroleum products, and would be administratively efficient and cost-effective. 46 Fed. Reg. at 
26,684. Similar distirbution plans could be devised for different situations. 
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ders and distribution plans that compensate injured consumers or 
classes of consumers in rough proportion to their use of the over-
priced products. 126 
These principles, of course, establish only general guidelines. 
The situations in which overcharges occurred and the types of ulti-
mate consumers injured varied widely, and the DOE must be free to 
tailor distribution plans to meet the exigencies of particular cases. 
The DOE's exercise of discretion in pursuit of its compensatory ob-
jective is entitled to considerable judicial deference.127 But it cannot 
ignore the compensatory standard adopted by its predecessors and 
ratified by Congress. 128 By treating consumer compensation as 
merely one factor to be considered, 129 the DOE has abused its discre-
tion. Only by adhering to the principles suggested by this Note will 
the DOE fulfill its statutory mandate.130 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has traced the evolution and repudiation of the DOE's 
compensatory obligation. With congressional encouragement, petro-
leum price control enforcement evolved under the FEO and the 
126. [I]t is frequently not possible to identify each individual customer or consumer who 
has been overcharged nor is it always possible to make a precise determination of the 
amounts each individual has been overcnarged. So long as a good faith effort was made 
to identify overcharged individuals, we would not view a distribution scheme which 
lacked dollar for dollar precision as unauthorized. 
Letter from Milton Socolar, supra note 14, at 10. 
For a discussion of the problems of class definition and under and overcompensation of 
class members, see note 59 supra. 
127. See Condor Operating Co. v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 351,359 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). 
128. Congressional ratification of the compensatory policies of the FEO and the FEA, see 
notes 66-76supra, gave those policies the "force oflaw," see Cammarano v. United States, 358 
U.S. 498, 510-11 (1959), and made agency compliance mandatory. See Helvering v. Winmill, 
305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) (regulations ratified by implication have "effect of law"); J.G. Boswell 
Co. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 682, 685 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 860 (1962) (regula-
tions ratified by implication have the effect of law). 
129. See text at note 85 supra. 
130. The policing of the DOE's discretion is especially important in the major refiner audit 
program. Consumer suits under § 210 of the ESA for refiner price violations are virtually 
impossible because only the DOE has the information necessary to prove an overcharge. The 
Department has been unwilling to share this information with potential plaintiffs. Complaint 
at 45, Minnesota v. Standard Oil, 4 EN. MNGMT. (CCH) ~26,316 (D. Minn. June 18, 1981). 
Thus, the protection of the overcharged consumer demanded by Congress requires close judi-
cial scrutiny of the DOE's consent orders to guarantee that the Department fulfills its compen-
satory obligation. 
For this reason, the DOE must also publish information sufficient to allow a reviewing 
court to determine whether the choice of remedies ''was based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Information relevant to this determination 
would include the amount, manner, and dates of the overcharges, and the persons or classes of 
persons victimized by the overcharge. The DOE has not consistently provided all of this infor-
mation in its consent orders. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) Consent Order (full text on 
file with the Michigan Law Review). 
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FEA to reflect a specific compensatory objective. That objective ma-
tured into an obligation to compensate injured consumers to the ex-
tent feasible as a result of congressional action in either 1975 or 
1977.131 However, this compensatory obligation is currently 
threatened from two sides. First, the DOE itself has failed to recog-
nize a duty to compensate, and has resolved violations and disbursed 
settlement funds in noncompensatory manners. Second, the GAO, 
reading the Department's compensatory obligation too literally, has 
argued that refunds are appropriate only to specifically identified in-
jured consumers. This Note has suggested principles under which 
the DOE must compensate not only readily identifiable victims of 
overcharges, but also "those unidentifiable ultimate consumers who, 
through their utility, transportation, or tax bills, may have borne any 
overcharges that did occur."132 
131. See Part I supra. 
132. Tenneco Oil Co.; Action on Consent Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,499, 29,501-02 (1981), 
